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Comments and Casenotes
PREMATURE CLOSING OF A CLASS UPON
DEATH OF A MEMBER
Sale Deposit & Trust Co. v. Forbes'
Dr. Emory died in 1916 and his will, made two days
before his death, contained the following provision:
"All the rest and residue of my estate of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situate to the Safe Deposit
and Trust Company of Baltimore in trust to hold the
same, with power of sale, investment, and reinvestment, to collect the income therefrom and pay over
the same to the natural or legal guardians of the infant children of my friend, Theodore W. Forbes, for
their benefit, share and share alike, until such time
as they shall respectively reach the age of thirty years,
at which time said children shall receive their respective shares of such rest and residue absolutely."
Another item of the will left $10,000 to the same trustee
for the benefit of the testator's housekeeper for life, and
at her death to become a part of the residue of his estate.
In 1922 one of the children died at the age of thirteen and
his parents petitioned the Circuit Court of Baltimore City
for distribution to them, as next of kin, of one-fourth of
the trust fund and for direction to the trustee to allot to
them one-fourth of the fund held for the benefit of the
housekeeper. The trustee and the three surviving children
were made parties to the petition, and a decree was passed
granting the relief sought by the parents. In 1924 another
child was born to Mr. and Mrs. Forbes, and in 1939 the
eldest child reached thirty. The trustee then petitioned
the Circuit Court of Baltimore City for instructions as to
any distribution, and the surviving children, including the
child born after the first decree, were made parties.
Held: (1) That the child born after the decree of 1923
is not bound by it; (2) That the class should have remained
open to include after-born children until the eldest child
reached thirty, but since under the decree of 1923 part of
the trust fund has already been distributed the decree of
1923 should be adhered to, and therefore the child who
1 Circuit Court of Baltimore City, per Smith, J., The Baltimore Daily

Record, January 16, 1940.
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has attained thirty is entitled to one-third of the residue
being administered for the benefit of the Forbes children,
to the exclusion of this child born after the first decree; and
(3) that the after-born child is not excluded from sharing
in the $10,000 fund being administered for the benefit of
the housekeeper during her life, and as to that fund the
request to determine distribution is premature.
The first point listed above raises the important problem
of the need for a procedural device whereby unborn or unascertained members of a class can be bound by a decree
where the living and ascertained members of the class are
properly before the court. Discussion of this problem is
beyond the scope of the present note, but it should be
pointed out that the simplest answer lies in having the
matter clarified by statute.
As to the second point listed above, the basis of the
decree passed in 1923 was the doctrine that the death of
a legatee, receiving the annual income with enjoyment of
the principal postponed, entitles his next of kin to immediate payment.' The testator's probable object in postponing distribution in such a case is to preserve the property intact until the beneficiary attains sufficient discretion
to handle the property in a careful manner. When the
legatee-beneficiary dies before reaching the age specified
in the will, the concern which the testator expressed about
the care of the property becomes moot. If, as here, he does
not specify who shall then take, and has not indicated
any concern about their ability to handle the corpus, it
may be presumed that he was ignorant of or indifferent to
these matters. It then becomes plausible to give the corpus
at the death of the legatee-beneficiary to those who take
from the legatee-beneficiary, since no intention of the
testator would be carried out by further postponing distribution. The income from the property will also be payable
to these persons, and allowing the trustee to continue to
manage the estate will result in no benefit to others, because the income he accumulated would ultimately be
turned over to the very persons entitled to the corpus.
2 For example, see Ill. Revised Statutes (1937) Ch. 22, Sec. 6, which
permits the appointment of a guardian ad litem, in suits in equity, whose
duty Is to protect the rights of unborn persons. See, also, Roberts,
Virtual Representation in Actions Affecting Future Interests (1936) 30 Ill.
L. Rev. 580.
Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. Jr. 13, 30 Eng. Rep. 866, 34 Eng. Rep. 809
(1795) ; Jacobs v. Bull, 1 Watts 372 (Pa. 1833) ; Felton v. Sawyer, 41 N. H.
202 (1860); McReynolds v. Graham, 43 S. W. 188 (Tenn. 1897); and
Bowman's Appeal, 34 Pa. St. 19 (1859).
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The doctrine is, therefore, reasonable and salutory when a
gift to individuals is involved and has generally been applied in such cases.
In Savin v. Webb,4 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
carried this doctrine one step farther, but the result in
that case was just as sound as in those involving gifts to
individuals. There the gift was $5,000 to each of X's
children when they should attain twenty-one. Interest
on the money was payable to these children from the date
of the testator's death. X was dead when the will was
made so there was no possibility of the size of the class
increasing. Furthermore, a specific sum was left to each
child, and each took a vested interest so that the amount
to be received did not depend on the ultimate number of
persons in the class. The same reasoning was applicable
as in the case of a gift to individuals because here also
the sole object of the testator in postponing distribution
was to keep the property intact until the legatees reached
an age of discretion. Thus the Court held that the administrator of a child who died under twenty-one was
entitled to immediate payment.
In the instant case, the decree of 1923, which was left
undisturbed, extends the doctrine to a gift to a class so
as to close the class and cut off after-born members from
the time of the death of one member. When there is a
gift to a class with payment postponed until the members
attain a given age (thirty in this case), the testator has
two intentions between which the law must choose. One
is his intention that all persons answering the class description should share in the gift, and the other is that
when a member reaches the required age he should obtain
his share. These two intentions conflict because no distribution can be made until the class is closed so that the
share of each member can be ascertained. It is necessary,
therefore, either to disregard his intention as to the time
of payment and keep the class open until the possibility
of increase in the membership becomes extinct, or to disregard his intention that all persons answering the class
description should be included so as to give effect to his
desire that each member receive his share upon attaining
the named age. The law has chosen the latter alternative
because it is in conformity with the policy for the early
settlement of estates. 5 The result of this rule of conven'96 Md. 504, 507, 54 A. 64, 66 (1903).
Thomas v. Thomas, 149 Mo. 426, 51 S. W. 111 (1896).
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ience is to cut off persons answering the class description
who are not in esse when the eldest reaches the stipulated
age.
Prior to the instant case, no reported controversy seems
to have involved the question of whether this rule of convenience should be extended so as to cut off those born
after the death of one member under the appointed age.
Such an extension of the rule is unwarranted because there
is no necessity to choose between conflicting intentions of
the testator. He has expressed no intention that the death
of a member should entitle the personal representative of
that member to immediate payment; but, on the contrary,
the earliest time he has indicated that distribution should
take place is when the eldest member should attain a particular age. Thus, there is no other intent which conflicts
with his desire that all who answer the description should
participate. The court should not consider itself to be
choosing between intentions but as giving effect to the only
one which is present.6
The opinion in the instant case indicated that if the
question had arisen at the time of the second construction
of the will, the decision would have been that the class
remained open until the eldest Forbes child reached thirty.
Although the child born after the 1923 decree was not precluded from challenging it, it was felt that it would be
unwise to make conflicting determinations of the same
question in the same case, particularly after money had
been paid out of the fund in obedience to the first decree.
Thus the opinion enforced a rule whose reasonableness it
criticized. It is submitted that in the future the discussion
contained in the opinion should be followed rather than
the actual result which the case reached.
With respect to the third point, dealing with the remainder in the $10,000 after the gift for life to the housekeeper, the opinion did not follow the allotment as directed
in the first decree. The child born in 1924 was allowed to
share in this part of the residue of the testator's estate,
and no determination was made of how it should be distributed, leaving the class open until the death of the life
tenant. The effect of the original construction of the will
on this part of the estate was not followed because nothing
had been paid out under it and no change in administration
of the $10,000 fund had resulted from the earlier decision.
6Casner, Increase in the 01a8s Membership (1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 254,
288, n. 93.
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The question was re-examined because the youngest child
was not bound by the decree of 1923 and no rights had
vested in reliance on it. This result seems to be clearly
desirable.
Elsewhere, the authorities are divided on the question
of exactly how distribution of such a remainder should be
made. The English authorities' hold that the residue, when
left to a class, must be distributed as a whole so that when
the class is first closed to make a distribution of any part
of the residue the question of what persons share in the
remaining portion is determined, and future-born members are excluded from any participation. The cases involving this problem arose where there was a residue consisting of present interests and future interests. The
English courts have reasoned that when a residue is left
to a class the intention of the testator is to make an immediate gift at his death. The result is that the class closes
at his death, and the fact that a part of the residue consists
of a future interest will not keep it open either as to the
entire residue or as to that part of it which consists of a
future interest. The policy of settling estates as soon as
possible led the courts to distribute the present interests
when the testator died, and they felt that it would be
inconsistent to construe part of the residue to go to one
group of persons and the other part to another group. This
result has also been reached in a New York case where it
is pointed out that the mere fact that a gift for life occurs
in another part of the will with remainder to fall into the
residue, does not alter the apparent intention to make an
immediate gift of the residue, so the class must close forever at the testator's death. 8 Applying this rule to the instant case would result in excluding the youngest child
from sharing in any part of the residue. Since the class was
closed in 1923 in order to make a partial distribution of
the residue, the English and New York courts would consider it closed for all purposes.
The instant case, however, bases its conclusion on reasoning contrary to the English and New York cases and
follows a North Carolina decision.' Then, when faced with
the same problem as the English decision above, the North
7 Hill v. Chapman, I Ves. Jr. 405, 30 Eng. Rep. 408 (1791) ; Hagger v.
Payne, 23 Beav. 474, 53 Eng. Rep. 186 (1857); Coventry v. Coventry, 2
Dr. & Sm. 470, 62 Eng. Rep. 699 (1865).
8
Baylies v. Hamilton, 36 App. Div. 183, 55 N. Y. S. 390 (1899), afrmed
165 N. Y. 641, 59 N. E. 1118 (1901).
9 Britton v. Miller, 63 N. C. 268 (1869).
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Carolina court held that after-born children could participate in property in which there was an outstanding life
interest but not in present interests in other property covered by the residuary gift. The theory behind their decision is that the testator did not anticipate such a situation
and that any attempt to determine his intention would result in a fiction.
Two principles are generally considered in such cases;
first, avoiding inconvenience through an early distribution
of the estate; and second, letting in as many children as
possible consistent with this principle of convenience. Allowing the after-born children to share in the future interests included in the residue, works out a satisfactory
compromise between these two principles. No inconvenience results because all property which can be distributed
at the testator's death is immediately divided among the
then existing class members, the property in which afterborn children are allowed to participate being incapable
of distribution at that time. As to these future interests,
the class is closed when the preceding estate ends as that
is the earliest time at which the interest can be distributed.
Since such a method of distribution does not violate this
rule of convenience, the principle of letting in as many
members as possible should govern. Thus, the decree in
the present case is based on a sound principle which has
met with approval in several articles and textbooks.1 0

ADMISSIBILITY OF FOREIGN WILL TO PROBATE
In re Will of Pritchard1
The testator, a resident of West Virginia, and at no
time a resident of Maryland, died in Florida on April 1,
1939. Shortly thereafter, a will (dated 1911) and two
codicils (the first dated 1915, the second not dated) were
probated in West Virginia. Later, a certain document
was offered for probate to the Orphans' Court of Baltimore
City. This document was found in a safe-deposit box in
102
SIMiu, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) 140; Warren, Future Interests
(1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 6.39; Casner, Increase in the Class Membership
(1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 254, 279.

'Superior Court of Baltimore City, per Niles, J., Baltimore Daily Record,

November 26, 1940.

